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THE SUPREME COURT AND COMMERCE
BY MOTOR VEHICLE
CHARLES P. LIGHT, JR.*
"Indian travois and canoe, ox cart, pack horse, Conestoga wagon,
stage coach, canal barge, steamboat, steam railroad, electric railway,
motor vehicle, airplane-these words spell the progress of transporta-
tion in America."'. This paper will deal with the motor vehicle, to
which is attributable much of present day legislation and litigation
for reasons not hard to find. In 1895, the year the internal com-
bustion engine was patented, four passenger cars were produced.
From such humble beginnings, the manufacture of motor vehicles
has become a major industry. During 1927, twenty-three million
vehicles were registered in the United States; seven states exceeded
the million mark for registrations. With motor cars have come im-
proved highways. 2 During the period 1918 to 1927, total expendi-
tures on state, county and local roads amounted to nearly nine billion
dollars.3 Travel ceased to be confined to the family passenger car.
The day of the motor bus and motor truck had arrived.
4
This phenomenal development has by no means sounded the death
knell of railroad transportation. Doubtless, as Commissioner Esch
reports: "Steam railroads are, and so far as now can be discerned
will remain, the backbone of the national transportation system."5,
Even so, comparison of investment in the railroad transportation sys-
tem, twenty-three billion dollars, with that in the highway system
including equipment shows the latter leading by three and one-half
billion dollars.6 The railroads are under strict federal supervision.
Congress has remained silent as to motor vehicles. So far as the
Commerce Clause is concerned, to what lengths may the states go in
regulating and taxing motor vehicles and motor vehicle transporta-
tion? Supreme Court decisions between 1916 and 1928 furnish the
source materials from which to fashion an answer.6'
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
'Esch, C., Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I. C. C. 685, 695
(1928).
2 Service Bulletin, American Automobile Association, June 1, 1928, p. 5.
'Ibid. p. 3.
' 140 I. C. C. 685, 699, n. 3.
'Ibid. p. 719.
' Ibid. p. 741.
" For a thorough discussion of the problems of motor carrier regulation,
see the following articles by David E. Lilienthal and Irvin S. Rosenbaum:
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE
(a) Motor vehicles; operators" permits, vehicle registration and ex-
actions therefor.
On July 1, 1910, Hendrick, "resident and commorant in the Dis-
trict of Columbia," left his Washington office by automobile for
Prince George's County, Maryland." The Maryland Motor Vehicle
Law, which went into effect that day, required that all persons using
the highways obtain an operator's permit and register with the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles, who would issue a car license. Hen-
drick failed to comply with the law, was haled before a Justice of
the Peace and fined fifteen dollars. In the Supreme Court, counsel
for Hendrick contended that the act was unconstitutional as a regu-
lation of interstate commerce. "Passing into or through states of
the Union in automobiles is an act of interstate commerce." And
this matter of interstate transportation being "capable" of uniform
regulation and legislation "is thus exclusively within the domain of
Congress." The subject is national in character, demanding uni-
formity of treatment, and even in the absence of congressional action
the state must keep hands off. Consequently the exaction of permit
and license is invalid as an attempt to regulate commerce and also
as imposing a direct burden upon it.
Counsel for Maryland countered by calling the act a valid exer-
cise of police power. He admitted that "since the automobile came
into more or less common use, this precise question has not been
before this court," but contended that the law only incidentally af-
fected interstate commerce. Regulation of the use of the highways
is a matter of local concern. Each side made use of the Cooley
classification, national-local, and of the more recent, directly burden-
incidentally affect, test.
In his opinion Mr. Justice McReynolds assumed that Hendrick
was engaged in interstate commerce, while sustaining the law. The
opinion contains these words, which in varying form have been used
often in later cases:
Motor Carrier Regulation by Certificates of Necessity and Convenience, 36
YALE L. 3. 163 (1926) ; Motor Carrier Regulation: Federal, State and Muni-
cipal, 26 COL. L. REv. 954 (1926); Motor Carrier Regulation in Illinois, 22
ILL. L. R~v. 47 (1927); Motor Carrier Regulation in Ohio, 1 U. OF CiNN. L.
R v. 288 (1927) ; The Regulation of Motor Carriers in Pennsylvania, 75 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 696 (1927). See also COMMENTS, 6 N. C. L. REv. 208, 7 N. C. L.
REv. 83.
'Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915).
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"In the absence of national legislation covering the subject a
State may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for
public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways
of all motor vehicles-those moving in interstate commerce as well
as others. . . . This is but an exercise of the police power . . . ;
and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate
commerce." 8
The court does not call the matter one of local concern but quotes
with approval from another case: "The provisions.., are not regu-
lations of interstate commerce. It is a misnomer to call them such."
Failure to classify as local is of little moment. We have the word
of Mr. Justice Hughes that "the principle, which determines this
classification [into subjects requiring uniformity or admitting of
diversity of treatment), underlies the doctrine that the States cannot
under any guise impose direct burdens upon interstate commerce."0
Burdick thinks that the newer form "states the basis of state action
more satisfactorily"; that it covers all the cases classified under the
national-local formula.10 He refrains from expressing an opinion
as to whether the sustained exercises of state power in the upper
register would fall within the older classification. Maybe this is not
important, for if we agree with Professor Powell, "when Congress
has not exercised its power at all, state action under the reserved
powers is held valid or invalid according to the supposed test of
some flexible formula which leaves the courts free to decide each
case as they think best.""
We have then, that a state may require all operators of automo-
biles on its highways to secure a permit to drive'2 and a license for
the car.' 3 Such requirements are "primarily for the enforcement of
good order and the protection of those within its own jurisdiction."
The Commerce Clause does not prevent.
Maryland, however, went further than this. The permit and
license were not issued gratis. For the first Hendrick paid a flat fee of
'Ibid. p. 622.
'The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 400 (1913).
" BuRicx, THE Lxw OF THE AmERIcAN CONSTITUTION (1922), p. 245.
'Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and the Constitution, 1919-20,
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY for September, 1920, p. 422.
"Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have drivers' license laws,
the minimum age requirement varying from fourteen to eighteen years. Op.
cit. note 2, p. 6.
"All states and the District of Columbia require vehicle registration by
residents. "Special Taxation for Motor Vehicles," Motor Vehicle Conference
Committee, January, 1928.
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two dollars, for the other either six, twelve, or eighteen dollars depend-
ing on horse-power. The money collected was to be used for salaries
and expenses of administration; any surplus, "to be used in con-
struction, maintaining, and repairing the streets of Baltimore and
roads built or aided by a county or the state itself." Hendrick con-
tended that "the tax imposed is not laid as compensation for the
use of the roads" but is "an unlawful attempt to collect revenue for
the state."
The court made short work of both contentions, saying: "A fur-
ther evident purpose was to secure some compensation for the use
of facilities provided at great cost from the the class of those for
whose needs they are essential and whose operations over them are
peculiarly injurious. . . . Thie statute is not a mere revenue meas-
ure. . ."14 Mr. Justice McReynolds felt that there could be no
doubt of the state's ability to effectuate its purpose by imposing an
annual fee based on horse-power. Prior decisions had sustained toll
charges for the use of highways,' 5 bridges over navigable streams,
public wharves.16 The state could choose either means. The income
derived need not cover merely the expense of maintaining the high-
way department. A surplus was permissible, in fact contemplated
although none was proved -to exist. Later, when it was shown to
exist the court upheld its application to the maintenance of improved
roads.1 7 Still more recently, the court seems to have decided that if
"the tax is assessed for a proper purpose and is not objectionable in
amount, the use to which the proceeds are put is not a matter" of con-
cern.' 8 It feels that "the amount of the charges and the method
of compensation are primarily for determination by the state it-
self. . ... 9o There is a point where the charges will be too high,
but "so long as they are reasonable and fixed according to some
uniform, fair and practical standard they constitute no burden on
interstate commerce."20  Words like "reasonable" and "fair stand-
ard" leave room for the exercise of state judgment.
14235 U. S. at 622, 624.
i' Federal Highway Act, U. S. C., Tit. 23, Ch. 1, §9 provides 2 "All high-
ways constructed or reconstructed under the provisions of this chapter shall be
free from tolls of all kinds."
235 U. S. at 624.
,Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 169.
Clark'v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 557.
"Supra note 16.4Ibid.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The result is that the state can make the interstate traveller pay
to help keep up its roads,2 ' possibly to help build its roads, so long
as it does not make him pay too much. Mr. Hendrick failed to prove
this and the court refused to "say from a mere inspection of the
statute that its provisions were arbitrary or unreasonable." The re-
served police power has triumphed. But how long will it last?
In Kane v. New Jersey,22 the court took occasion to show that
the license fee in Hendrick's Case was not sustained on the ground
that Maryland granted reciprocal free use of its highways to non-
residents. So far as the Constitution goes, it need not do so.28
An added fact in Kane's Case was the New Jersey requirement
that non-resident autoists constitute the secretary of state their agent
for service of process.24 Both provisions withstood Fourteenth
Amendment objections.
Johnson v. Maryland,25 the third case involving automobiles upon
highways is not a Commerce Clause decision. But it should be men-
tioned nevertheless. As Mr. Justice Holmes expressed it in his
usual terse style: "The naked question is whether the state has power
to require [a driver of a Post Office Department truck] to obtain a
license by submitting to an examination concerning his competence
and paying three dollars ... ."26 And he was of opinion that Mary-
land had not. The limitation upon the state's power because of our
dual system of government is stricter than that worked by the Com-
merce Clause. However, the driver is not relieved from obeying all
state laws. It is intimated that he would still have to comply with
"a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners
of streets."
'In 1927, the total gross receipts from state registration fees, including
drivers' licenses, amounted to 300 million dollars. Bureau of Public Roads,
Table MV-2 (1927).
2242 U. S. 160 (1916).
"In fact many states have reciprocity laws applying to registration by non-
residents. Op. cit. note 2, p. 5.
'A Massachusetts statute, providing that use of the highway by a non-
resident shall be treated as the equivalent of appointing a state official his agent
for service of process, was held not to violate the Due Process Clause, in Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927); while in Wuchter v. Pizutti, 48 S. Ct.
259 (1928), a similar New Jersey law was held to violate that clause, for
failure to contain a provision making it reasonably probable that the non-resi-
dent would receive notice of service on the official.
254 U. S. 51 (1920).
Ibid. at 55.
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(b) Motor trucks; contract carriers; liability and cargo insurance,
indemnity bonds; common carriers.
In Michigan Commission v. Duke,27 one Duke was under con-
tract to carry automobile bodies from Detroit to Toledo by motor
truck.28 His hauling business was done entirely under private con-
tract He did not hold himself out as a carrier for the public in any
way. By Michigan law "no person shall engage in the business of
transporting persons or property by motor vehicle for hire upon the
public highways of the state over fixed routes or between fixed
termini, unless he shall have obtained from the Michigan Public
Utilities Commission a permit so to do." This permit would only
be issued in accordance with public convenience and necessity. The
law provided that persons engaged as above stated should be com-
mon carriers and must carry insurance or furnish an indemnity bond
to cover any claims resulting from injury to the property carried.
Does the law run afoul the Commerce Clause in the absence of con-
gressional action?
Requiring Duke to use his trucks as a common carrier, says Mr.
Justice Butler, is "to take from him use of instrumentalities by means
of which he carries on the interstate commerce in which he is en-
gaged and so directly to burden and interfere with it."29 Preventing
him from using the trucks "exclusively to perform his contracts"
where "his sole business is interstate commerce" is an unconstitu-
tional interference with commerce. Further, compelling him to sub-
mit to the "onerous duties and strict liability of common carrier" is
a direct burden on interstate commerce. So is the requirement that
he furnish cargo insurance or indemnity bond. But why? We can
at once see that there is factual interference with Duke's business
and we admit that this business is interstate. But not all factually
direct interferences are prohibited by the Commerce Clause. We
get no help from noticing that the state requirements were con-
= 266 U. S. 570 (1925).
',"Truck operations fall into one of three general classes: (1) Where the
truck is owned by the operator and is used in the transportation of his own
goods or products and in the conduct of his business-the owner-operated truck;
(2) the so-called contract carrier, who enters into special agreements for
transportation with one or more shippers, but does not hold himself out to
haul for the public generally; (3) the common-carrier truck, which (a) oper-
ates on .schedule over a regular route or between fixed termini, and usually at
published rates, from which it may not depart, and (b) the so-called anywhere-
for-hire carrier." 140 I. C. C. at 705.
'266 U. S. at 577.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ditions precedent to the carrying on of interstate commerce. So they
were in the Hendrick3 0 and Kane3l cases. The court gives us its
answer in these words:
"Clearly, these requirements have no relation to public safety or
order in the use of motor vehicles upon the highways, or to the col-
lection of compensation for the use of the highways. The police
power does not extend so far."
' 2
Unless the state law promotes safety or effects compensation it is
invalid. Requiring a private carrier to submit to regulation as a
common carrier or to carry cargo insurance does not promote either.
This result follows from the Commerce Clause.
With respect to the first requirement, Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R.
Cor. 33 laid down that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented it as
applied to a local carrier. Neither Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion
for the majority, nor Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent, nor any express-
ions in either vary the decision on this point in the Duke case.
With respect to the cargo insurance, the court, it seems, has
properly applied its line of distinction. Only by tenuous reasoning
can relation be shown between such insurance and safety in the use
of motor cars on highways. But suppose insurance was required
against death or injury to third persons, resulting from the operation
or construction of the vehicle. Such a requirement of exclusively
intrastate operators survived Fourteenth Amendment objections in
Packard v. Banton.34 And in the latest case on the subject Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis says that requiring this kind of insurance is not, "even
as applied to busses engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, an
unreasonable burden on that commerce, if limited to damage suffered
within the state by persons.other than the passenger." 35
"Supra note 7.
' Supra note 22.
"2Supra note 29.
13271 J3. S. 583 (1926).
3'264 U. S. 140 (1924).
" Sprout v. City of South Bend, Ind., 48 S. Ct. 502, 505 (1928). See also
Elsbree and Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle Accidents,
76 U. oF PA. L. Rsv. 690 (1928).
Conclusion 10 of the report, supra note 1, 140 1. C. C. at 746, reads: "[Fed-
eral] legislation for the regulation of motor-bus lines operating as common
carriers over the public highways should provide as prerequisites to operation:
(1) Certificate of convenience and necessity; and (2) liability insurance or
indemnity bond or satisfactory assurance of financial responsibility which will
insure adequate protection for the responsibility assumed."
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(c) Motor busses; certificates of convenience and necessity; federal
highway legislation.
Buck v. Kuykendal 3 6 involved a law of the State of Washington
which required common carriers by automobile to obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity before operating. Buck wanted
to set up as a common carrier of passengers and express between
Seattle and Portland. He had received the Oregon equivalent of a
certificate of convenience. Washington refused him one on the
ground that the field was adequately served already by trains and
other bus lines. The court held that "such state action is forbidden
by the Commerce Clause. It also defeats the purpose of Congress
expressed in the legislation giving federal aid for the construction of
interstate highways."37
This is the first case where an Act of Congress has played a part
in the decision as to state power. In the case of the sustained registra-
tion and license requirement, should Congress take over the field,
inconsistent state laws would become inoperative. But it is not clear
from a reading of the Federal Highway Acts3 8 that they cover the
Buck situation. The lower federal courts were of opinion they did
not. And in a case decided the same day, Bush Co. v. Maloy, 9
where the Maryland highway in question was not federally aided,
Mr. Justice Brandeis explained that such aid was not a controlling
reason for the decision in Buck's Case. The Commerce Clause itself
invalidated that state law, in that the law directly burdened com-
merce. What the federal legislation did was to make "clear the pur-
pose of Congress that state highways shall be open to interstate com-
merce." 40  Where Congress is silent as in the Bush case, it means
hands-off because the subject-the existence of adequate facilities-
is one of national concern "peculiarly within the province of federal
action." 41 Phrased differently, the effect on interstate commerce "is
not merely to burden but to obstruct it." Where Congress has
spoken even to the limited extent of the road aid legislation, it may
be considered not as a taking over of the field, 'but as giving its sanc-
tion to the judicial solution of the problem.
-267 U. S. 307 (1925).
'Ibid. at 316. But such action is recommended to be taken by the federal
government, supra note 35, and in part upon the consideration of already avail-
able transportation service. 140 I. C. C. at 747.
3267 U. S. at 314.
"267 U. S. 317 (1925).
4 267 U. S. at 324." 267 U. S. at 316.
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But suppose Congress should be persuaded by the dissent of Mr.
Justice McReynolds that "the exigency [of suddenly increasing motor
vehicles] cannot be met through uniform rules laid down by Con-
gress. . . Control .by the states must continue, otherwise chaotic
conditions will quickly develop." 42  Suppose the solons said to the
states, "you may apply your statutes to interstate commerce by motor
vehicle in all its phases until we see fit to regulate the matter our-
selves." The possibilities of such action by Congress have been
effectively canvassed by Professor Bk16.43 Perhaps he is right in
believing that we should deduce from the decisions sustaining Liquor
Legislation a broad principle of choice of means. But there is enough
of talk in the cases which characterizes that legislation as sui generis
to make one doubt. Wouldn't it have simplified things if Mr. Chief
Justice Taney's view of concurrent state power over all interstate
commerce had survived ?4
The fact of federal aid was one ground of the argument in Morris
v. Duby45 against applying the provisions of Oregon's highway law.
When the first federal act was passed Oregon law provided that no
motor truck of over five tons capacity should be operated on a state
highway without a permit. The then existing law allowed a twenty-
two thousand pound load. Finding that the roads were being injured,
the State Commission changed its rules and refused permits for loads
over sixteen thousand five hundred pounds. Morris, who operated
0267 U. S. at 325.. "Chaotic conditions" did develop. "Any serious com-
plaint against bus operations appears to be directed against those conducted by
noncertificated, unregulated interstate operators commencing operations after
the state regulatory bodies were deprived by decisions of the Supreme Court of
such control as they had exercised over interstate motor carriers." 140 1. C. C.
at 702.
" Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARv. L. REv. 200. Cf. Dowling and
Hubbard, Divesting an Article of its Interstate Character, 5 MINN. L. Rzv.
100, 253.
The Interstate Commerce Commission recommends that "original jurisdic-
tion in the administration of regulation over motor-bus lines" be vested in state
boards and, where necessary, joint boards composed of two or more state
boards, with appeal from either to the Interstate Commerce Commission. 140
I. C. C. at 746. The Commissioner's reasons for thinking this solution con-
stitutional are set forth, ibid. at 743.
"Mr. Justice McReynolds would let the states act "until something is done
which really tends to obstruct the free flow of commercial intercourse." Inas-
much as there was an element of obstruction, in fact, in the Washington and
Maryland laws, "really" must connote the idea that. the factual flow can be
checked if it is in part an economically unnecessary flow. "Really" also sug-
gests motive and the Justice gives the state laws a clean bill of health, for they
"indicate an honest purpose to promote the best interests of all." 267 U. S. at
325." 274 U. S. 135 (1927).
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over twenty-two miles of federally aided road between points in
Oregon and Washington, alleged that the state and federal acts con-
stituted a contract whereby he could operate his five ton trucks re-
gardless of load. Mr. Chief Justice Taft brushed aside the contention,
saying:
"Conserving limitation is something that must rest with the road
supervising authorities of the state, not only on the general consti-
tutional distinction between national and state powers,4 6 but also for
the additional reason, having regard to the argument based on a con-
tract, that under the convention between the United States and the
state, in respect of these jointly aided roads, the maintenance after
construction is primarily imposed on the state." 47
State conservation regulations, like licensing of operators, and ve-
hicles, are valid unless arbitrary or unreasonable. And "the mere
fact that a truck company may not make a profit" carrying the de-
creased load does not amount to unreasonableness.
(d) Further of (a), (b), (c).
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Clark v. Poor48 reaffirmed the power of
the state to tax an interstate motor truck line for the maintenance
of the highways and administration of highway laws. The tax was
graduated according to the number and capacity of the vehicles
used.4 9 It was imposed in addition to the annual license or regis-
tration fee. The Justice said:
"There is no suggestion that the tax discriminates against inter-
state commerce. Nor is it suggested that the tax is so large as to
obstruct interstate commerce." 50
Clearly, a tax which falls on interstate commerce in certain ways
called "discriminatory" is prohibited. But the only claim was that
an interstate common carrier had to pay two taxes while others paid
only one. The case decides that where motor trucks use the highways
as their place of business, they are properly chargeable with an extra
'It is curious that on the commerce point, the Chief Justice (274 U. S. at
144) quoted from the Buck case (267 U. S. at 315) part of a passage in Mr.
Justice Brandeis' opinion, beginning thus: "In support of the decree dismissing
the bill this argument is made:... ," and ending, "The argument is not sound."
(Italics by author.)
274 U. S. at 144, 145.
"274 U. S. 554 (1927).
"As to "common-carrier fees and taxes on motor-trucks," see 140 I. C. C.
at 711, and for requirements in each state, see op. cit. note 13.10 274 U. S. at 557.
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tax for such use. Discrimination does not rest on a simple mathe-
matical excess.
In the quotation above, Mr. Justice Brandeis uses "obstruct" in-
stead of "directly burden." Once before, in Bush v. Maloy,5 1 he
said the effect of a statute was "not merely to burden but to obstruct"
interstate commerce. Many sustained laws factually burden inter-
state commerce, but the interference is sustained on a balance of con-
siderations and is called "indirect." This expresses a result. The
reason lies behind the adjective. Perhaps "obstructs," connoting the
idea of physical stoppage, more correctly expresses not only the re-
sult but the reasons behind it.
Two other features of the Clark case engage attention, chiefly
because they are old friends. The Ohio law required a certificate of
public convenience partially conditioned upon filing a policy covering
liability and cargo insurance. In the District Court, the Commis-
sion admitted it could not now withhold the certificate because the
roads were crowded and in the Supreme Court, stated that the insur-
ance requirements would not be insisted upon. Consequently, aided
by a separability clause 52 in the law, the court was able to sustain it,
by treating as inoperative the objectionable feature's and by following
the Commission's lead in ignoring the questionable ones.
MIxTE COMMERCE:
(a) Licenses to operate; competition with railways.
We have seen that a state cannot withhold a certificate of con-
venience from one engaged exclusively in interstate commerce by
motor vehicle. Many bus lines carry both interstate and intrastate
passengers.5 3 What is the extent of the state's power to refuse a
certificate in this situation?
In Interstate Busses v. Holyoke RyY4 the vehicles ran from
Connecticut into Massachusetts. A substantial part of the business
consisted of local carriage. Part of its way, the bus line paralleled
a street railway doing an interurban business. The railway's income
'Supra note 39.
'A note, Effect of Separability Clauses in Statutes, 40 Hnv. L. Rv. 626, is
lielpful.,e "While there is an appreciable amount of long-distance travel by bus, and
it will grow with the improvement of highways and the consolidation and
development of stronger bus lines, nevertheless at present travel by bus is pre-
dominantly local and short haul." 140 I. C. C. at 699.
"273 U. S. 45 (1927).
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was being eaten into. 55 Massachusetts had a law which required
carriers by motor bus to secure a license from each municipality
through which its cars ran. To prevent enforcement of the law at
the instance of the railway company, the motor carrier sought an
injunction. The District Court denied it and the Supreme Court
sustained the lower court.
The argument for the bus company was based on the two Kansas
cases 56 in which the state law imposed a tax on the total capital stock
of foreign corporations doing both an interstate and local business.
The court decided in those cases that a tax on the local privilege may
have such economic effect that it amounts to the same thing as a
direct burden on interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Butler said: "The
appellant relies on [the Kansas decisions]. But there the state was
using its authority as a means to accomplish a result beyond its con-
stitutional power." 57 He did not need to say whether the principle
would control this case. The trouble was that no facts were adduced
which showed any intent to regulate or any regulation in fact of
interstate carriage of passengers. The law was on the books before
motor bus travel became common. The only place the railway com-
pany sought to have the act enforced was along the route where it
competed with the bus line. The record failed to show how many
interstate passengers were carried competitively, or that it was not
reasonably practicable for the bus line to separate them, or even that
the interstate business was "dependent in any degree upon the local
business in question." For exclusively interstate travel by motor bus,
neither state nor municipality can require a certificate or license. The
Massachusetts statute recognized this. But where the carrier mixes
up interstate and local carriage the "burden is on [him] to show that
the enforcement of the Act operates to prejudice interstate carriage
of passengers."
The case reaches a result that is highly desirable. It is unfor-
tunate enough to have a temporarily5" unregulated field in the case
Compare the situation in Indiana where the railway operated a bus line.
"A competing bus line also operates over the same route. There are also com-
peting bus lines over portions of the route. The traction company reports that
it has been compelled to charge so low a rate on its bus line owing to the keen
competition that it is making only about one-4half of the cost of operation."
140 I. C. C. at 727.
' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 (1910) ; Pullman Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U. S. 56 (1910).
273 U. S. at 51.
See note 43.
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of all-interstate traffic. It might play havoc to relieve the bus line
of state control on the simple showing that some passengers were
travelling interstate.
(b) Licenses to operate; bus line competition; city terminals.
It is a treat to read Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line.59 Here are
the facts. Schappi, an Illinois corporation, operated three lines of
motor busses under a certificate of public convenience from the
Indiana Public Service Commission. The business was mainly inter-
state and on one line, wholly interstate. Busses of each of these
lines ran into Hammond, Indiana, where the terminal was located in
the business district. In 1924 the city authorized the Calumet Com-
pany,.a competitor of Schappi, to run its busses and to stop them on
any street to take up or discharge passengers. An ordinance was
passed in 1925 forbidding busses to operate on streets leading into
and-through the business district, or to stop to collect or discharge
passengers anywhere in the city, without a permit. But the ordi-
nance was not to affect any motor vehicle contracts to which the city
was a party. Hammond admitted that the Schappi busses could not
continue their present routing under this ordinance, but argued that
it was passed "to prevent congestion of traffic and to promote safety."
Schappi denied the fact of congestion and the record showed that
there was at least an hour's parking privilege on both sides of the
streets which his busses travelled. His theory was that the ordinance
was designed purely to protect Calumet. And he objected that the
city was without power to act under state law, that the ordinance
was invalid under the state constitution, and under the Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals held the ordinance inoperative because of
discrimination, without mentioning what law or constitutional pro-
vision necessitated the result. It ignored the Commerce Clause argu-
ment. In remanding the case to the District Court, Mr. Justice
Brandeis said:
"Whether it is void under the law of Indiana involves questions
upon which this court should not be called upon to pass without the
.aid which discussion by members of the lower courts familiar with
the local law would afford.
1275 U. S. 164 (1927). Hammond v. Farina Bus Line, 275 U. S. 173, was
,decided the same day. "The contentions, the issues of fact and of law, and
the chracter of the evidence introduced, are largely similar to those in the
Schappi case."
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"On the other hand, if it should become necessary to consider
Schappi's rights under the Commerce Clause, it is not fitting that
these should be passed upon by this court upon the present record
and at this stage of the proceedings." 60
He put five pertinent questions, raised by the briefs and arguments,
which had not been considered by either of the courts below. As he
expressed it, "before any of the questions suggested, which are both
novel and of far reaching importance, are passed upon . . . the facts
essential to their decision should be definitely found . . . upon ade-
quate evidence." 61
-Schappi's Case is chiefly important for what it fails to decide and
why. It demonstrates that constitutional decisions are not to be made
in the dark. It vividly instances "an application of a new technique
in constitutional [decision] wherein an appreciation of facts is the
decisive element .... -a2 To be appreciated the facts must be shown.
APPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court has continued to insist on having all the
facts presented; what the meaning of the state action is in terms of
interstate business. In Interstate Busses v. Blodgett,63 a Connecticut
motor bus corporation, engaged exclusively in interstate commerce,
was subjected by that state to four taxes in common with intrastate
carriers.64 Fifth, there was imposed a tax of one cent for each mile
of highway in the state travelled by any of its busses. This was
called "an excise on the use of such highway." In place of it, intra-
state motor carriers were subjected to an excise of three per cent of
their gross receipts.0 5 Interstate busses objected to the mileage tax
as one discriminating against interstate commerce, for the reasons
(1) that "there are obvious differences between it and the gross re-
"275 U. S. at 169, 170.
Ibid. at 171, 172. See Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact
Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 H~Av. L. REv. 6.
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIs, THE BUsINESs OF THE SUPREME COURT, p.
192. "Decision" is substituted for "arguments." The quotation is' apt, how-
ever, for it refers to the type of argument and brief which Mr. Brandeis, when
counsel, introduced in the Muller case.
48 S. Ct. 230 (1928).
"These were: (1) personal property tax upon cars used in state, (accord,
35 states and the District of Columbia, op. cit. note 13) ; (2) registration fee,
(accord, all states) ; (3) gasoline tax of 2 cents per gallon, (5 cents-6 states,
4 cents-12 states, 3 cents-15 states, 3/2 cents-1 state, 2 cents-12 states and
D. C., no tax-Mass, and N. Y.) ; (4) corporation income tax of 2%.
""Declared to be in lieu of all taxes on intangible personal property."
And payment of gross receipts tax exempted from paying the 2% income tax.
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ceipts tax" and (2) that "it already contributed to the maintenance-
of the highways of the state in the same manner and to the same-
extent as others."
To the first objection Mr. Justice Stone replied that neither dif-.
ferences in form or method of assessment of taxes, nor the fact that
one must pay more named taxes, without more, establish discrimina-
tion. He is unable to say "from a mere inspection of the statutes that
the mileage tax is a substantially greater burden on appellant's inter-
state business than its correlative, the gross receipts tax, on com-
parable intrastate business." To get relief it must be shown "that
in actual practice the tax of which [one] complains falls with dis-
proportionate economic weight." 66 This is significant language: the
mere fact that Connecticut singled out interstate commerce and taxed
it, doesn't mean that the tax is unconstitutional. Has Mr. Justice
Stone converted the court to a view.that a state may tax interstate
commerce? His answer to the company's second objection shows
that he is treating the tax as a price paid for a special facility, here-
tofore sustained as a valid police measure. It is no objection to this-,
excise that the state has imposed others for the use of its highways.
The company failed to show that the total of charges sustained "no
reasonable relation to the privilege granted."
The last case to be discussed in this paper, Sprout v. South
Bend,67 evidences that the court is still hampered by the treatment
which other courts accord Commerce Clause questions. It is illustra-
tive of the assiduity of our High Bench to sustain state and muni-
cipal laws.
Sprout operated a bus between South Bend, Inciana and Niles,
Michigan, carrying mostly interstate passengers. South Bend re-.
quired a license to operate any motor bus for hire on its streets and
imposed a fee of fifty dollars per bus. Sprout paid the state regis-
tration fee but refused to comply with the city ordinance. Some of
his passengers he put down before reaching the Michigan line. True,
they paid fares to a Michigan point, but in fact they were intrastate
pass~ngers.68 In the state court it was not shown what percentage-
M48 S. Ct. at 231.
a48 S. Ct. 502 (1928). See COMMENT, 7 N. C. L. REv. 83.
" Without in any way meaning to imply that Mr. Sprout was practicing a.
subterfuge, we read in 140 I. C. C. at 703 that "certain operators pick up pass-
engers at Fall River, Mass., run their busses south a short distance over the-
Rhode Island-Massachusetts line, turn around, and then proceed north to Bos-
ton, Mass."
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of Sprout's business was the result of intrastate carriage. That
court did not mention it "nor did it consider whether [his] rights as
an interstate carrier would be affected by his engaging also in ifitra-
state business," a very pertinent question under the Holyoke case.
It sustained the fee as a police measure on the ground that Sprout
was using the streets as a place of busines, even though engaged in
interstate commerce.
In holding the ordinance invalid, Mr. Justice Brandeis calls the
roll of sustained state and municipal legislation.
(1) License (inspection) fees to defray the expenses of admin-
istering safety regulations. The fee here does not fall under that
head for
"'it does not appear that . . . it was imposed as an incident of such a
scheme of municipal regulation; nor that the proceeds were applied
to defraying the expenses of such regulation; nor that the amount
collected under the ordinance was no more than was reasonably re-
.quired for such a purpose." 69
(2) Fee for the use of special facilities. There are two objections
to putting the tax under this head. First, the ordinance itself as
well as the Indiana court's treatment of it fails to show that any of the
proceeds of the tax go to keep up the streets. Second, the fee is flat,
imposed regardless of the nature or number of the trips made by the
carrier. However, the size of the charge varied with 'the seating
capacity of the bus. Mr. Justice Brandeis does not hold that all flat
-taxes are bad for his second reason just given. He guardedly says
that such a flat tax "could hardly have been designed" as a measure
of the value of using the streets..
(3) Occupation tax on an intrastate business. To sustain the fee
-under this head "it must appear that it is imposed solely on account
of the intrastate business." That is, the burden is on the city to
justify such an imposition. This was not the approach taken in the
Holyoke case where cities along the bus route were allowed to de-
mand "licenses," in all probability to refuse them, in the absence of
a showing by the bus company of prejudice to its interstate business.
But in that case there was no attempt to tax, simply to regulate in
the best interests of the public, presumably. In the Sprout case, for
211 that appeared, the ordinance requiring license and fee would apply
48 S. Ct. at 504.
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to those engaged solely in interstate commerce; and the Indiana
court so assumed.
The case, then, decides that an ordinance which imposes a tax on
all (and interstate) carriers using the city streets, but fails to pro-
vide that the proceeds shall be used for street administrative or main-
tenance purposes, is invalid. Calling it a license fee does not save it.
As was said in an earlier case, if a tax "bears upon commerce among
the states so directly as to amount to a regulation in a relatively im-
mediate way, it will not be saved by name or form."' 70 There was
no showing of discrimination in the sense of "disproportionaate eco-
nomic" incidence. A state or city cannot tax interstate commerce
unless it justifies. Mr. Justice Stone did not cut a new path in the
Blodgett case. He did put the emphasis in the right place there, as
when he remarked to the American Bar Association, that "where
commerce is concerned, it seems clear that the function of the court
must continue to be, as in the past, to prevent discrimination." But
his test of discrimination is to be applied only after determination
that the exaction falls within an approved class.
One thing more remains to be mentioned. The license was not
to be issued to Sprout unless he paid the tax. Of this feature Mr.
Justice Brandeis said: "The privilege of engaging in [interstate com-
merce] is one which a state cannot deny. . . .A state is equally in-
hibited from conditioning its exercise on the payment of an occu-
pation tax."71 Payment of an unconstitutional tax cannot be made
a condition precedent to engaging in interstate commerce. It is
supposedly true as well, that "payment of even a lawful tax may not
be enforced by the exclusion of the taxpayer from interstate com-
merce." Whether this principle "goes so far as to prevent a state
from excluding from its highways a motor carrier which refuses to
pay a charge for their use," a valid exaction, has not been determined,
for the Supreme Court is not willing to assume that a carrier will
persist in refusing to pay what it rightfully owes.
1 2
The court has pointed out the line by which the states may regu-
late and tax commerce by motor vehicle, in the absence of congress-
ional action, without running athwart the Commerce Clause. Be-
cause it decided that they cannot prevent this commerce upon con-
"Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227 (1908).
748 S. Ct. at 505.
48 S. Ct. at 231.
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siderations of convenience, Buck v. Kuykendall 73 may stand out as
the most important case of the series. It has brought appreciably
nearer, not only the day of federal regulation of motor bus trans-
portation,7 4 but possibly, of "definite coordination of all existing
transportation agencies on land, water, and air."
'75
Supra note 36.
"For a discussion of the legislation proposed in the 69th Congress, see 140
I. C. C. at 733-736.
11140 I. C. C. at 748. And thus without specific intent, we end as -we began,
by quoting from this careful report.
